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RECENT DECISIONS
that the court will limit its investigation to plaintiff's good faith
when the action is commenced.
NANcY A. Simos
Federal Income Taxation-Alimony Deduction-"Fixed" Pay-
ments for the Support of Children. A deficiency was asserted against
the taxpayer because he took a deduction for the full amount of alimony
paid to his wife. The Commissioner's contention was based on a provi-
sion in the divorce decree that "in the event that any of the [three]
children . . . shall marry, become emancipated, or die, then the pay-
ments herein specified [which were awarded to the wife alone] shall
on the happening of each such event be reduced in a sum equal to one-
sixth of the payments which would thereafter otherwise accrue." He
asserted that this provision bought one-half of the alimony payments
within the terms of the predecessor of Section 71(b) of the 1954 Inter-
nal Revenue Code' as sums "fixed" for the support of children. Also,
since such sums would not be included in the wife's gross income, they
should not have been taken as deductions by the husband. 2 The Tax
Court3 agreed with the Commissioner and held that the decree "as a
whole," fixed these payments for the support of the children. The
Court of Appeals 4 reversed and held that this provision did not "fix"
any sum that the wife was obligated to use for the support of the child-
ren prior to the happening of any of the contingencies. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. It held that the
intent of Congress was to provide certainty in this area and thus there
must be a specific designation of amounts to be used for the support
of children, and not an allocation based on inference or conjecture.
Commissioner v. Lester, -U.S.-, 81 S. Ct. 1343 (1961).
Prior to this decision, there was a dispute in the Tax Court and the
various circuit courts over the interpretation of Section 71(b). By
granting certiorari,5 the Supreme Court finally decided to take a position
and settle the dispute. Provisions in divorce decrees which stated that
a certain unqualified sum was to go to the wife, or that specified that
' Section 22(k) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended in 1942,
provided: "This subsection shall not apply to that part of any such periodic
payment which the terms of the decree or written instrument fix, in terms of
an amount of money or a portion of the payment, as a sum which is payable
for the support of minor children of such husband." Section 71 (b) contains
substantially the same language: "Subsection (a) shall not apply to that part
of any payment which the terms of the decree, instrument, or agreement fix,
in terms of an amount of money or a part of the payment, as a sum which is
payable for the support of minor children of the husband." In this article,
further reference to the provision will be made to Section 71(b) only.
2See: Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §215.
3 Lester v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1156 (1959).
4Lester v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960).
5 Certiorari was denied in Commissioner v. Weil, 353 U.S. 958 (1957), and
Eisinger v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 913 (1958).
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a certain amount was to be paid to the wife and a separate portion paid
for the support of the children have caused no difficulty. The dispute
arose from provisions that gave a sum to the wife which was to be used
for the support of herself and her children and was to be modified in
the event she remarried or the children died or became of age.
The two opposing positions in the interpretation of Section 71(b)
were the "liberal" and the "strict" views. The "liberals" were comprised
of the Tax Court,6 and the First,7 Seventh" and Ninth9 Circuits. Their
interpretation of the section was that the decree was to be read as a
whole, and if such reading disclosed that the parties had earmarked or
had designated some portion for the support of the children, then such
portion was to be "fixed" for such purpose by the decree.10 Thus, this
view would look at the modification provisions and would make an
inference of an allocation from them. The Tax Court held that any of
the contingencies for reduction contained in the modification provisions
were sufficient to make this allocation," but the court in Eisinger v.
Commissioner12 disregarded contingencies which might never come into
being and held that these did not enter into a determination of an allo-
cation. In view of the Service's ruling, 3 it seems that the "contingency
which might never come into being" is the remarriage of the wife.
The "liberals" also contended that since the husband has the duty to
support the children, it would be harsh and inequitable to the wife for
a strained or an unnatural construction of the statute which shifts the
tax burden from the husband to the wife.14 The label on a decree should
6 A list of all the cases of both positions can be found in the annotation in 4
A.L.R. 2d 252, §10, and the A.L.R. 2d Supplemental Service volumes. The
Tax Court has consistently held, except in Seltzer v. Commissioner, 22 T..C.
203 (1954), and in Newcombe v. Commissioner, 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 141
(1951), that the insertion of specific amounts in the modification provisions
"fixes" part of the payments for the support of the children.
7 Metcalf v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 288 (lst Cir. 1959).
8 Mandel v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 50 (7th Cir. 1950).
9 Eisinger v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1957).
10 Id. at 308.
11Hirshon v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 558 (1956), rev'd, 250 F.2d 497 (2d Cir.
1957); Weil v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 612 (1954), supplemental opinion, 23
T.C. 630 (1955), rev'd, 240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 958(1957).
12 Supra note 9, at 308.
13 Rev. Rul. 93, 1959-1 Cuifi. BUL. 22. "The Service will follow the decision of
the United States Court of Appeals in the Weil case on this issue in cases
involving similar facts and circumstances. [The Weil case involved a decree
which modified the payments only in the event of the wife's remarriage.]
However, in determining whether payments made under a divorce decree or
separation agreement are to be treated as alimony or whether a portion is for
the support of minor children, the Service will continue to follow its position
as set forth in the rationale of the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals in the Eisinger case." For an argument as to why the remarriage
clause should not be said to "fix" payments for the support of children see:
Miller, Courts, IRS, Struggle With Taxation of Alimony When Part Is Spent
on Others, 11 J. TAXATION 160 (1959).
14 Eisinger v. Commissioner, supra note 9, at 308, and Mandel v. Commissioner,
supra note 8, at 52.
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not be controlling, especially where, as an afterthought, the parties do
make some sort of an allocation. 15 Basically, this position maintains
that by the insertion of specific amounts in modification clauses, the
parties themselves can be said to have intended a certain part of the
payment to be necessary for the support of the children.16
On the other hand, the "strict" view, made up of the Second 7 and
Sixth's Circuits, held that there was no ambiguity in the language of
Section 71(b). "Fixed" was construed in its usual sense of "to assign
precisely; to make definite and certain."' 9 In the decision of Weil v.
Commissioner, 2 0 it was stated that "sums are 'payable for the support
of minor children' when they are to be used for that purpose only.
Their use must be restricted to that purpose, and the wife must have
no independent beneficial interest therein." An intention to provide for
the wife and she in turn to provide for the children is different from
an intention to provide for the children specifically.21
Prior to the Second Circuit's holding in the Lester case, the "strict"
view had never been faced with the type of provision that the rule in
the Eisinger case was intended to govern. The Weil case provided for
modification only in the event of the wife's remarriage, which had been
considered one of the uncertain contingencies. In Deitsch v. Commis-
sioner"2 there was no consistency in the amount of reduction when the
various contingencies occurred. The Lester case did have this consist-
ency in its modification provisions and did include reductions in the
event of the death or the becoming of age of the child. But it also con-
tained a provision that all the payments were to cease upon the remar-
riage of the wife. However, this can be considered as an uncertain
contingency.
The Lester case, which is the only decision that actually can be com-
pared with cases applying the "liberal" view, agreed with the rationale of
15 Ashe v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 331, 335 (1959).
16 Eisinger v. Commissioner, supra note 9, at 307-8.
"T Weil v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1957); Hirshon's Estate v. Com-
missioner, 250 F2d 497 (2d Cir. 1957); and Lester v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d
354 (2d Cir. 1960).
38 Deitsch v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1957). It is interesting to
note that the Sixth Circuit decided Budd v. Commissioner, 177 F2d 198 (6th
Cir. 1947), in favor of the "liberal" position. The court in the Deitsch case
did mention, though, that the modification provisions in the Budd case "ear-
marked" the payments for the support of the children. In Solomon, Some
Recent Developments in the Taxation of Alimony and Support Payments,
N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 787, 794-95 (1958), the author discusses this
change of position and states that, "if the essential factor is whether the wife
is free to use some of the funds, which the agreement might otherwise be
deemed to designate as being for child support, for her own benefit . . . then
the Budd case was incorrectly decided."
19 Deitsch v. Commissioner, supra note 18, at 536.
20 240 F.2d 584, 588 (2d Cir. 1957).
21 Ibid.
22 Supra note 18.
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the Weil case. The Second Circuit reasoned that the wife is given the
whole sum to use as her best judgment dictates. The reduction in the
modification provisions does not indicate that before the happening of
such contingencies the wife's discretionary power has been limited to
the amount specified. To allow an allocation based on the modification
provisions would take away the wife's discretion entirely "23 and would
logically allow a suit by the children to compel the mother to use certain
amounts for their support. The court felt that this construction of Sec-
tion 71(b) did not work any greater hardship on the wife than the effect
of decrees that gave the wife a lump sum and contained no modifica-
tion provisions. Congress must have realized that where the wife was
given a lump sum, part of it would be used for the support of the
children and yet it desired to tax the wife on it.
In affirming the "strict" view, the Supreme Court devoted much of
its decision to a review of Congressional pronouncements at the time
that this section was passed. The court quoted from the House and
Senate Committee Reports which indicated that the new law was de-
signed "' to remove the uncertainty as to the tax consequences of pay-
ments made to a divorced spouse,... to produce uniformity in the treat-
ment of amounts paid,'" and to assure the department of collecting a
tax, since after paying the alimony, the husband might not have any
money left for taxes.24 The first draft of the section used the phrase,
"specifically designated" instead of "fix," but this change was only to
achieve a "more streamlined language. '"2 Because of these statements,
the court held that Congress intended that payments to the wife were
to be included in her gross income unless the decree expressly specified
or "fixed" a certain sum or percentage of the payment for child support,
and "a sufficiently clear purpose" on the part of the parties is insuffi-
cient to shift the tax.
"2 -
The court stated that a person is taxed on income which he is free
to enjoy at his own option, whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not. Here,
the wife was free to spend the monies received as she saw fit, and there-
fore she should have been taxed upon this amount. This reasoning was
considered by the court to be in conformity with the underlying philos-
ophy of the Code because it gives "as great an internal symmetry and
consistency as [the Code's] words permit."7 -
23 Lester v. Commissioner, supra note 4, at 357.
21 Commissioner v. Lester, -U.S.--, 81 S. Ct. 1343, 1345 (1961).
25 Id. at 1346.
20 Commissioner v. Lester, supra note 24, at 1347.
27 Id. at 1346. Although the court did not mention it, there is some authority for
this "control" test in a statement in the House discussion of the bill by a
Mr. Disney. "The amount of a husband's income which goes to the wife as
alimony under a court order is in reality not income to him at all since he has
no control over it as the use to which it is to be put. The bill recognizes this
reality by permitting the husband to deduct so much of his income as is paid
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Uniformity and consistency in the interpretation of Section 71(b)
have been achieved by this decision. It is no longer necessary to deter-
mine whether the contingencies are certain or uncertain, and if certain,
whether they provide a basis for an allocation. Also, the ingenuity of
the draftsman is not of prime importance. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion abolishes any resort to deceptive modification provisions which
would not have been held to "fix" a sum for the support of children.
Such provisions formerly achieved practically the same result as provi-
sions which were subject to an allocation by the "liberal" courts.2 8
Therefore, where a state statute allows a general alimony provision
for the support of the wife and the care of the minor children,29 the
parties may bargain with one another to achieve the best possible tax
result. One of the factors to be considered is which of the parties de-
sires to take the $600 exemption for each of the children. If the hus-
band would rather take a deduction for the full amount of the alimony
paid instead of the $600 exemption, he might be able to persuade the
wife to take a larger amount of alimony, which would include the
money needed to pay the tax. No matter what result the parties agree
upon, the law remains that where the payments are to the wife for her
support and for the support of the children, such payments are to be
included in her gross income regardless of any modification provisions.
It is only when the decree specifically states, for example, that $300 is
to be paid for the support of the wife, and $200 for the support of the
children, that the amount for the support of the children is not included
in the wife's gross income.30
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out in alimony." 1 SErDmAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND
ExcEss PROFITS TAX LAWS, 1953-1939 p. 1280 (1954). This "control" test is
consistent with the definition of income subject to tax which was applied in
Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952). There it was held that taxable
income is possessed when the recipient has such control over it that, as a
practical matter, he derives readily realizable economic value from it. This
would occur when cash is delivered by its owner to the taxpayer in a manner
which allows the recipient freedom to dispose of it at will.28Articles which have discussed the various ways to draft decrees to escape an
allocation are: Burke, Gift, Estate and Income Tax Problems in Marriage and
Divorce Arrangements, 1959 TULANE TAX INST. 174, 201; Brawerman, A
Practical Approach to Tax Problems in Divorce and Property Settlement
Agreements, U. So. CAL. 1960 TAx INST. 753, 758-59; and Holland Piper,
Bailey, and Sander, Matrimony, Divorce and Separation, N.Y.U. 18TH INST.
ON FED. TAX. 901, 913 (1960).
29 An example of such a statute is Wis. STAT. §24726 (1959).
30 Although the federal courts may not infer an allocation for tax purposes,
this does not prevent the state courts from doing so for the purpose of modi-
fying the decree. For a general discussion of the latter issue, see: Allocation
of Apportiownent of Previous Combined Award of Alimony and Child Sup-
port, 78 A.L.R. 2d 1110 (1961). The Supreme Court in the Lester case, supra,
note 24, at 1346-47, recognized this power of the state courts, but held that
even if such an allocation was made, the allocation would not affect its hold-
ing on the interpretation of Section 71 (b).
